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Using information from 193 banks in 58 countries, we develop and analyze indicators of 
physical access, affordability and eligibility barriers to deposit, loan and payment services. We 
find substantial cross-country variation in barriers to banking and show that in many countries 
these barriers can potentially exclude a significant share of the population from using banking 
services. Correlations with bank- and country-level variables show that bank size and the 
availability of physical infrastructure are the most robust predictors of barriers.  Further, we find 
evidence that in more competitive, open and transparent economies, and in countries with better 
contractual and informational frameworks, banks impose lower barriers. Finally, though foreign 
banks themselves seem to charge higher fees than other banks, in foreign dominated banking 
systems fees are lower and it is easier to open bank accounts and to apply for loans. On the other 
hand, in systems that are predominantly government-owned, customers pay lower fees but also 
face greater restrictions in terms of where to apply for loans and how long it takes to have 
applications processed. These findings have important implications for policy reforms to broaden 
access. 
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1.  Introduction 
To open a checking account in Cameroon, you need over 700 dollars, an amount higher 
than the GDP per capita of that country, while no minimum amounts are required in South Africa 
or Swaziland.  Fees to maintain a checking account exceed 25 percent of GDP per capita in 
Sierra Leone, while there are no such fees in the Philippines.  The fees for transferring 250 
dollars internationally are 50 dollars in the Dominican Republic, but only 30 cents in Belgium.  
While most people in the developed world take access to banking services for granted, price and 
non-price barriers prevent large parts of the population in developing countries from accessing 
and using formal banking services. If we follow previous estimates (Genesis, 2005b) that poor 
people cannot afford to spend more than 2 percent of their household income on bank charges, 
the fees observed in many countries effectively prevent them from using such accounts. 
Similarly, the requirement of a physical address or of a formal sector job as eligibility criteria to 
open an account excludes the majority of people in many developing countries, where a large 
percentage of the population lives in rural areas and works in the informal sector. 
This paper presents new indicators of barriers to bank access and use of banking services 
around the world, shows their significance for outreach and relates them to bank and country 
characteristics.   First, through surveying the largest banks in 58 countries, we document the 
extent of barriers to three banking services - deposits, loans and payments - across three 
dimensions - physical access, affordability, and eligibility. Second, we show the importance of 
these barriers for access to and use of financial services.  Third, we explore which bank and 
country characteristics are associated with these barriers, with findings that have important 
implications for policies to broaden access. 
Market frictions such as transaction costs and information asymmetries give rise to 
financial institutions and markets (see Diamond 1984, 1991, Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984,   2 
 
Boyd and Prescott 1986). These market frictions, however, can also limit the extent to which 
financial institutions can reach out to clients. Transaction costs that to a large extent are 
independent of the size of the financial transaction – deposit, loan or payment – make outreach to 
clients with demand for small transactions costly.  High information asymmetries and the 
resulting agency problems make outreach to opaque clients more difficult and costly.  Barriers 
such as high minimum account balances and fees, multiple documentation requirements and high 
payment fees might reflect high transaction costs and the contractual and business environment 
in which banks operate.  However, they might also reflect the competitive framework and the 
availability of physical infrastructure in the market where banks offer their services.   
Financial exclusion can retard economic growth and increase poverty and inequality.   
Theoretical models have shown that financial market frictions that prevent broad access can be 
the critical mechanism for generating persistent income inequality or poverty traps (Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993).  A large empirical literature has established the 
importance of banking sector depth for economic development and poverty alleviation.  Based 
on extensive cross-country databases, researchers have explored the relation between indicators 
of financial sector depth and GDP per capita growth, productivity growth, poverty, firm growth 
and entry rates (see King and Levine, 1993; Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2004; 
Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2006).  Much less is known, however, about the determinants and 
implications of access to financial services by individuals and firms.  This is because data on 
who has access to which financial services remain thin and inadequate.  This paper contributes to 
closing this gap in the literature. 
Our data show substantial cross-bank and cross-country variation in barriers to banking. 
While banks in 19 countries do not impose any minimum balances for checking accounts, such   3 
 
balances are higher than 10 percent of GDP per capita in 14 countries. While one document is 
needed to open an account in five countries, four documents, including ID, payment slip, proof 
of domicile and reference letter, are required in six countries, effectively preventing large parts 
of the population from accessing these services. While it is possible to apply for a loan over the 
phone or the Internet in six countries, customers can only submit loan applications at bank 
headquarters or at branches in five countries.  
We conduct consistency checks on our data and show that, in general, banks in more 
economically and financially developed economies impose lower barriers. Also, we show that 
barriers are negatively correlated with financial outreach – measured by branches, loans and 
deposits per capita – and with lower financing obstacles as reported by firms. Our indicators thus 
capture an important aspect of banking sector outreach across countries. 
While double-digit ratios of minimum balances, fees and minimum loan amounts to GDP 
per capita already give a first impression of the limited affordability of many of these services for 
large parts of the population in a number of countries, we offer back-of-the-envelope calculations 
using data on income distribution. We find, for example, that fees to maintain checking accounts 
effectively prevent more than 30 percent of the population from using such services in ten of the 
58 countries in our sample.  
  We also explore which bank- and country-level characteristics are associated with 
barriers to banking. Consistent with the argument of scale economies in banking, we find that 
larger banks consistently impose lower barriers. Better physical infrastructure is also robustly 
associated with lower barriers. In more competitive, open and transparent economies bank 
customers also face lower barriers.  Further, we find evidence that banks in countries with a more 
efficient contractual and informational framework impose lower barriers on customers. Finally, 
the relationship between barriers and bank ownership is not a simple one. Though foreign banks   4 
 
themselves seem to charge higher fees than other banks, in foreign dominated banking systems, 
fees are lower and it is easier to open bank accounts and to apply for loans. On the other hand, in 
systems that are predominantly government-owned, customers pay lower fees but face greater 
restrictions in terms of where to apply for loans and how long it takes to have applications 
processed. 
This paper is related to an emerging literature on access to financial services. Most of the 
existing research and the efforts underway focus on country case studies that aim at measuring 
and analyzing access to financial services at the household or firm level (see Claessens, 2006 and 
Claessens and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). Few papers study this issue by focusing directly on 
banking services providers. Recently, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2007) present 
aggregate cross-country data on banking sector outreach (such as branch and ATM penetration, 
deposits per capita, and loans per capita) and show that these indicators closely track more 
difficult and costly to collect micro-level statistics of household and firm use of banking 
services.  More directly related to our paper, Genesis (2005a) examines the costs of using bank 
accounts in seven countries - Brazil, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa. 
However, in contrast to our study, this report focuses exclusively on deposit service affordability 
in a small number of countries. 
While our paper is the first systematic effort to document and analyze banking barriers 
across countries, it has a number of limitations. First, our attempt to compare standard products 
across a broad sample of countries is limited by differences in financial practices.  For example, 
while in some countries checking accounts are the prevalent form of transaction account, in other 
countries checking accounts might not be widely used and savings accounts might be preferred. 
Furthermore, even the same type of financial product, e.g., an SME loan, might have different 
definitions and features across banks and countries. We therefore assess barriers on somewhat   5 
 
different deposit and loan products. However, to the extent standardized products are not offered 
across countries, it is difficult to overcome this problem.
1 Second, fees and charges might differ 
because of differences in the scope and quality of the services provided rather than because of 
differences in pricing strategies. Third, we focus on the largest banks, not on the whole banking 
system. While this seems a restriction, by focusing on the largest banks we capture the barriers 
encountered by a majority of customers in a country. Finally, the nature of our survey is such 
that we are not able to capture non-bank financial institutions, such as finance companies and 
microfinance institutions. In spite of these shortcomings, we see this paper as an important first 
step in the effort to create consistent cross-country indicators of barriers that households and 
firms face in accessing financial services. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the survey used 
to collect bank-level information.  Section 3 presents the indicators and discusses their cross-
country variation. Section 4 shows that these barriers are correlated with cross-country indicators 
of outreach and firms’ financing obstacles and section 5 offers back-of-the-envelope calculations 
that show the impact of some of these barriers on access. Section 6 relates our indicators to bank 
and country characteristics associated with the institutional, contractual and, competitive 
environment, and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The survey 
The dataset is constructed from a web-based survey with 75 questions that was sent to the 
five most important banks in 115 countries in 2004 and 2005.
2  We chose to focus on the largest 
                                                 
1 We also considered asking questions on standardized loans and deposits, yet decided to collect information on 
actual barriers as opposed to “hypothetical” ones based on products that might not exist in all countries. 
2 We defined importance in terms of total assets or branches.  Data collected from bank regulators and analyzed by 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) indicates that on average the five largest banks in over 100 countries account for 
73 percent of bank assets and deposits.   6 
 
banks since we are interested in the barriers encountered by the average customer in each 
country. Survey responses were carefully “cleaned” through extensive follow-up with the banks 
whenever we had questions about the data provided.  While we received a total of 253 responses 
from banks in 88 countries, to insure representativeness, we limited the analysis in this paper to 
countries for which the responding banks constitute at least 30% of the market in terms of total 
loans/total deposits or where we received a response from the largest bank.
3  This gives us a total 
sample of 193 banks across 58 countries.   
  Table 1 presents all the countries in our sample and shows their level of economic and 
financial development, as measured by GDP per capita in U.S. dollars and private credit to GDP, 
respectively. Also, the table contains information on the number of banks (out of the top 5 banks) 
that responded to our survey, along with the market share that they represent. Our sample 
comprises countries across all levels of financial and economic development. Countries range 
from Ethiopia with a GDP per capita close to 100 dollars to Switzerland, where GDP per capita 
exceeds 34,000 dollars. With banking sector credit at 2 percent of GDP, Mozambique is the 
country with the lowest level of financial development in our sample, while Denmark and 
Switzerland rank at the top with private sector credit exceeding 150 percent of GDP. In terms of 
regions, our sample coverage is also quite balanced. Our dataset  includes 15 countries from 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 13 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, 9 countries in Western 
Europe, 8 Latin American and Caribbean countries, 5 countries from the Middle East and North 
Africa, 4 countries in South Asia, 3 countries in East Asia and 1 non-European developed 
country (Australia).  
                                                 
3 We determined the market share using data from Bankscope.  We have data for the largest bank constituting less 
than 30% of the market in only one country, Swaziland. In Algeria too, we only have data for the largest bank, but 
this bank accounts for more than 30% of the market.   7 
 
  In terms of market share, for 56 out of the 58 countries in our sample the share of 
deposits captured by respondents exceeds 30 percent. Banks from France and Zimbabwe are not 
included in the calculations for deposit and payment barrier indicators because the market share 
of bank respondents in these countries is below 30 percent. When it comes to loans, the share 
represented by bank respondents exceeds 30 percent in 53 countries. In this case, the countries 
excluded from the sample are Germany, Nigeria, Romania, Swaziland, and Sweden. In 34 (29) 
countries the share of deposits (loans) exceeds 50%. On average across countries, the banks that 
responded to our sample account for 57 percent of the deposits and 53 percent of the loans in the 
countries in our sample, based on data from Bankscope.  
 
3. The indicators 
This section presents our indicators of barriers to banking across countries. Tables 2, 3 
and 4 present the country-level averages including descriptive statistics and Figures 1 through 16 
show the cross-country variation graphically. Table 5 reports correlations across the different 
barriers. We separate our indicators based on the type of service: deposit, loan and payments. We 
report averages for each country calculated by weighing each banks’ responses by their share of 
deposits in total deposits of all sampled banks in the case of deposit and payment barrier 
indicators and by the share of loans for loan barrier indicators.  Also, wherever possible, we try 
to distinguish between three different service dimensions: physical access, affordability, and 
eligibility. Physical access refers to the points of service delivery. Greater physical access means 
services are delivered in multiple and more convenient ways. Affordability refers to the costs in 
terms of minimum balances and fees that bank clients need to pay to obtain financial services, 
such as checking or savings accounts, consumer or SME loans, international payment transfers 
and use of ATM cards. Finally, eligibility refers to the criteria (in terms of documents or other   8 
 
requirements) that determine who can access financial services and who cannot. Regulatory 
requirements, e.g. in the context of anti-money laundering legislation, might force banks to 
impose such eligibility requirements.  In the case of lending, we use the days needed to process a 
loan application as an eligibility criterion since some potential bank customers might not apply 
for loans if they need financing urgently and they know it takes a long time to get a decision. 
 
3.1. Deposit services 
The main products we consider in terms of deposit services are the checking and savings 
accounts. Across countries, there are differences in the extent to which savings or checking 
accounts are the dominant transaction account type. We therefore assess barriers to deposit 
services based on survey questions related to both account types.  Potential customers can 
encounter barriers to the use of deposit services in terms of the need to visit headquarters to open 
an account instead of doing it in the local bank branch or a non-branch office (physical access), 
payment of high minimum balances and fees (affordability), and the requirement to present 
multiple documents to open an account (eligibility). We will discuss each of these barriers in 
turn. Weighted country-level averages are presented in Table 2.  
 
Physical access 
Physical access to banking services can often be hampered by long distances from the 
next bank outlet (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2007).  However, even if there is a 
sufficiently wide network of bank offices, not all of these offices might offer the same services.  
We measure physical access in deposit services by considering the locations to open a deposit 
account. This indicator takes values from 1 to 3 depending on whether an account can be opened 
at headquarters only (1), at headquarters or a branch (2) or at headquarters, branches or a non-  9 
 
branch office (3).
4 While the majority of sampled banks in Greece and Sierra Leone require 
customers to visit the head office to open a checking account, customers in Moldova can open 
such an account at headquarters, branches and even branch-like offices.  Overall, we find a 
substantial variation in the locations to open a deposit account (Figure 1).  In the median country, 
customers can open accounts at headquarters or branches but not at non-branch offices. 
 
Affordability 
We characterize the affordability of deposit services across countries by looking at the 
minimum balances required to open checking and savings accounts, along with the fees needed 
to maintain such accounts. There is substantial variation in the ratio of the minimum balance 
needed to open a checking account to GDP per capita (Figure 2). While in Cameroon and 
Nigeria, the minimum balance exceeds 100 % and in Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Uganda, more 
than 50% of per capita income is required to open a checking account, the amount is zero in 19 
countries, less than half of which are developed.
5 The median value for this indicator is 0.6 % 
and the average is 10.9%. While some of the variation in this indicator might be explained by the 
denominator – GDP per capita – the correlation between the amount necessary to open an 
account and GDP per capita is far from perfect (-0.28) and even in dollar terms, there is a 
significant variation in minimum balances.  
The ratio of the minimum balance needed to open a savings account to GDP per 
capita (Figure 3) ranges from zero in nine countries (i.e., Australia, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, 
Egypt, Israel, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey) to over 40% in Cameroon, Kenya, Sierra Leone 
                                                 
4 We consider only the most local office, i.e. banks that allow customers to open an account at a branch or a non-
branch office receive the same rating (3) as banks that allow customers to open an account at headquarters, a branch 
or a non-branch office. 
5 Countries for which the minimum balance to open a checking account averages  zero include: Algeria, Australia, 
Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Croatia, Denmark, Georgia, Germany, Israel, Lithuania, Malawi, Moldova, South Africa, 
Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.    10 
 
and Uganda. The median value for this indicator is 1.1%. The required minimum balance to open 
a savings accounts is on average only slightly below the minimum balance in checking accounts,  
8.1% for the former compared to 10.9% of GDP per capita for the latter.  
As reported in Table 2, there is a similar variation across countries in the balances that 
have to be maintained in checking and savings accounts. Thus, the affordability barriers expand 
beyond the initial stage of opening a checking or savings account.  There is a high correlation 
between the amounts needed to open and to maintain checking and savings accounts, although 
on average, the amounts are significantly lower to maintain than to open an account, 2.9% and 
6.2% of GDP per capita for checking and savings accounts, respectively.
6  
Fees associated with maintaining a checking or savings account also vary 
significantly across countries (Figures 4 and 5).  While in Malawi, Uganda and Sierra Leone, 
checking account fees amount to over 20% of GDP per capita, these accounts are free in 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Ethiopia, India, Jordan, Malta, Pakistan, Philippines, and Sweden. The 
median value for the fees associated with checking accounts is 0.3% and the average is 2.4%. 
Savings accounts fees are significantly lower than those associated with checking accounts, 
ranging from zero in 29 countries to almost 4% of GDP per capita in Malawi and Uganda.  The 
average value across countries for the fees on savings account is 0.4% while the median is 
exactly zero.  
 
Eligibility 
Around the world, banks demand proof of identification to open an account for a new 
client.  However, banks in many countries demand a variety of other documents on top of ID 
cards, including recommendation letters, wage slips, and proof of domicile.  To quantify these 
                                                 
6 Given the high correlation between minimum balances to open and to maintain accounts, we will focus on the 
minimum balances to open an account in the subsequent analysis.   11 
 
eligibility requirements, we create indicators of the number of documents required to open 
checking and savings accounts, respectively. While banks in Albania, Czech Republic, 
Mozambique, Spain and Sweden demand on average only one document to open a checking 
account, banks in Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chile, Sierra Leone, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Uganda require at least four documents (Figure 6). On average, a slightly smaller number of 
documents is required to open a savings account (2.1) relative to a checking account (2.5). In 10 
out of 52 countries for which information is available on the number of documents needed to 
open a savings account, only one type of document is required.
7 On the other hand, more than 
three documents are needed in Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ghana, Malta, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, and Trinidad and Tobago (Figure 7). 
 
3.2. Credit services 
We collected indicators of physical access, affordability and eligibility for four different 
loan types – business, SME, consumer, and mortgage loans. However, due to space constraints 
and because of our interest in products available to individuals and to typically constrained 
smaller firms, we focus on consumer and SME loans (see Table 3).  Nevertheless we report 
indicators on the other loan types in Appendix Table A.1. Indicators of physical access, 
affordability and eligibility barriers are highly correlated with each other across the different loan 
types.  
Physical access 
To measure physical access for loans, we examine the locations to submit a loan 
application. While customers in Algeria, Armenia, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Uganda can only 
                                                 
7 These countries include: Albania, Algeria, Belarus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Mozambique, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, and Sweden.   12 
 
apply for loans at a bank’s headquarters and branches, customers in Australia, Chile, Denmark, 
Greece, South Africa and Spain not only can use branch and non-branch outlets, but even submit 
loan applications over the phone and the Internet (Figure 8). In the median and average country, 
bank customers can submit loan application at headquarters, branch and branch-like offices. 
 
Affordability 
We measure loan affordability by looking at the minimum balances required for 
consumer and SME loans and at the fees for these loans. The minimum amount for consumer 
loans relative to GDP per capita ranges from less than 1 percent in Denmark and Switzerland 
to 330 percent of GDP per capita in the Philippines (see Figure 9). The median minimum amount 
for consumer loans is 18.54 percent, while the average is 52.29 percent. 
While banks in Algeria, Belarus, Denmark, and Egypt do not specify minimum amounts 
for SME loans, banks in Bangladesh set a minimum of almost 10,000 percent of GDP per capita 
and those in Uganda and Georgia report a minimum of over 2,000 percent of GDP per capita 
(Figure 10). These very high minimum loan requirements suggest that in those countries banks 
do not meet the external financing needs of smaller enterprises. The average minimum amount 
for SME loans is 558 percent and the median is 58 percent of GDP per capita.  
Fees on consumer loans expressed as a percentage of minimum loan amounts range 
from zero in Algeria, Belgium, Ethiopia, and Switzerland to over 20 percent of the minimum 
loan amount in Chile and the Dominican Republic (Figure 11). The median fee on consumer 
loans is 2 percent and the average is 4 percent.   13 
 
Fees on SME loans also exhibit a significant cross-country variation. Fees vary from 
zero in Algeria and Switzerland to close to 30 percent in the Dominican Republic (Figure 12). 




  A crucial function of financial intermediaries is to screen borrowers beforehand and to 
monitor them during the lifetime of a loan.  However, the number of days it takes to process a 
loan application can be perceived as a de facto eligibility barrier, since some borrowers might 
not apply for bank loans and seek financing elsewhere to avoid long waiting periods. For 
consumer loans, this indicator ranges from almost one day in Australia, Brazil, Czech Republic, 
Denmark,  Greece, Israel and Spain to over 20 days in Pakistan (see Figure 13). The average 
number of days to process a loan application is 4 and the median is closer to 3.  
  SME loan application are processed in less than 2 days in Denmark and Spain but take 
more than one month to process in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Philippines (Figure 14). Across 
countries, it takes an average of almost 11 days to process a loan application. The median 
number of days is 8. 
 
3.3. Payment services 
Our indicators on payment services measure primarily affordability. We examine the 
costs of transferring a small amount of funds internationally and the fees associated with using 
ATM cards (see Table 4).
9  
                                                 
8 We also computed loan fees relative to GDP per capita, as the ratio of loan fees to minimum loan amounts might 
also represent variation in minimum loan amounts additional to variation in fees.  While that ratio gives different 
rankings of countries, the results reported in sections 4 and 6 do not differ across ratios of fees to minimum loan 
amounts or GDP per capita.  
9 Though ATM cards can be used for transactions other than withdrawing cash (e.g., transferring funds across 
accounts), we think of ATMs as primarily facilitating payments by allowing the withdrawal of funds.   14 
 
The cost of transferring funds internationally varies from 0.12 percent in Belgium to 
20 percent in the Dominican Republic (Figure 15).
10  To compute these ratios and to make them 
comparable across countries, we focus on a typical transfer of 250 dollars.  On average, the cost 
of transferring funds internationally is 6.5 percent or $ 16.35. 
We express the fees associated with ATM transactions as a percentage of 100 dollars. 
We find that ATM fees are above 0.4 for Pakistan and Nigeria, average 0.1 across countries 
while the use of ATM is free for 50 percent of the sample (Figure 16).   
 
3.4. Correlations 
Table 5 shows the pairwise correlations between the different barrier indicators, averaged 
on the country level.  Most of the variables are significantly correlated with each other, although 
the correlations are stronger among indicators of the same type of service (deposit, loan or 
payment) than between indicators across the different services.  
Among deposit service indicators, we find that banks in countries with high minimum 
balances for checking accounts also require high minimum balances for savings account, as 
expected. Also, fees are correlated across account types and higher checking fees are positively 
correlated with higher minimum checking and savings deposit balances required to open deposit 
accounts. In countries with high deposit fees and high minimum balances, prospective depositors 
are also required to present a larger number of documents to open accounts.  
Loan indicators are also correlated with each other but to a lesser extent than is the case 
among deposit indicators. SME and consumer loan fees are significantly correlated with each 
other and so are the days to process SME and consumer loan applications. The indicators on the 
number of days to process loans are also positively correlated with minimum loan balances. 
                                                 
10 While we also considered the speed of transfers in terms of days, we found little variation across banks and 
countries.   15 
 
Among the payment service indicators, the cost to transfer funds internationally is positively 
correlated with the fees associated with using ATM cards. 
Across the three different types of services, we find that countries with higher minimum 
loan amounts also tend to have higher minimum deposit amounts and, in the case of consumer 
loans, also higher checking fees. Also, we find a significantly positive correlation between the 
number of documents required to open accounts and the days to process loan applications. 
Finally, we observe that higher loan fees are correlated with higher costs of transferring funds 
internationally and higher fees for using ATM cards are positively associated with more 
requirements to open deposit accounts. 
 
4. Barriers to banking, financial and economic development, and outreach 
  In this section we explore the association between our barrier indicators and existing 
measures of financial and economic development, as well as of financial outreach (Table 6). In 
many ways, examining these correlations represents a consistency check on our indicators.   
   As expected, we find that barriers to banking are negatively correlated with economic 
development. Specifically, minimum balances to open accounts and fees to maintain them, the 
number of documents to open accounts, the minimum amount of consumer loans, the days to 
process consumer and SME loans, and the fees for using ATM cards are negatively and 
significantly correlated with GDP per capita. In the same way, we find that the number of places 
to submit loan applications, an indicator of lower barriers to physical loan access, is positively 
and significantly correlated with GDP per capita.   
  Further, we find that higher barriers are consistently negatively associated with financial 
development.  Table 6 shows that private credit to GDP – a standard measure of financial 
intermediary development – is negatively and significantly correlated with the minimum   16 
 
balances to open accounts, the annual fee and the documents to open checking accounts, the 
minimum amount for consumer loans, the days to process SME and consumer loans, and the fees 
for using ATM cards. On the other hand, private credit to GDP is positively and significantly 
correlated with the number of locations to submit loan applications.  Interestingly, the fees on 
consumer and SME loans, the cost to transfer internationally and the locations to open deposit 
accounts are not significantly correlated with economic or financial development.  
To gauge the relationship between barriers and aggregate measures of financial sector 
outreach, we utilize recently compiled data on branch penetration and the number of loan and 
deposit accounts (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2007).   These are country-level 
indicators, compiled from regulatory surveys and publicly available information. We would 
expect countries with banks that impose higher barriers on their customers to invest less in the 
number of branches and higher barriers to be also reflected in fewer deposit and loan accounts 
per capita. 
  The correlations in Table 6 suggest that higher barriers are indeed associated with lower 
outreach. Specifically, banks in countries with a higher demographic branch penetration demand 
lower minimum balances to open accounts, require fewer documents to open accounts, are more 
likely to accept loan applications in branch-like offices or over the phone or Internet, set lower 
minimum loan amounts, are quicker at processing loan applications, and charge lower fees for 
using ATM cards.  Similarly, banks in countries with higher loans per capita have lower 
minimum loan amounts, are quicker in processing loan applications and are more likely to accept 
these applications outside headquarters and through non-traditional channels such as phone or 
Internet. Banks in countries with more deposits per capita demand lower minimum balances and 
lower fees, require fewer documents to open such an account, set lower minimum amounts for   17 
 
consumer loans, are faster in processing loans and are more likely to accept loan applications 
through non-traditional channels.     
  These correlations are simply that – correlations. They do not imply causality.  They 
show, however, that our indicators capture an important dimension of financial sector 
development: the limited outreach of the banking system implied by higher barriers.  They 
suggest that barriers to banking go hand in hand with less physical access to banking offices and 
lower use of deposit and credit services by households and firms.  
  Finally, higher barriers are associated with higher financing obstacles as reported by 
firms.  We use responses to firm-level survey questions on “Is access to financing (e.g. 
collateral) a problem to the operation and growth of your enterprise?” and “Is cost of financing 
(e.g. interest rates) a problem to the operation and growth of your enterprise?” from the 
Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) surveys conducted by the World Bank across 36 (access) 
and 37 (cost) countries. Responses to these questions are coded between zero (no obstacle) to 
four (very severe obstacle), with higher values thus indicating more severe financing 
constraints.
11  We take the average across all firms in a country.  We find that firms report higher 
financing obstacles in countries where banks impose higher minimum amounts to open checking 
and savings accounts and charge higher fees to maintain these accounts, where banks do not 
accept loan applications through non-traditional channels and take longer to process SME loan 
applications.  Finally, firms report higher financing obstacles in countries where banks demand a 
larger number of documents to open bank accounts.  It is interesting to note that firms’ financing 
obstacles are more significantly correlated with barriers related to deposit services than with 
barriers related to payment or loan services.  This suggests that firms rely to a large extent not 
only on credit services, but on a whole array of financial services from financial institutions.  
                                                 
11 There is a growing literature that shows the importance of financing obstacles for firm growth and financing 
patterns (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005; Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2006).    18 
 
 
5.  Financial exclusion – the effects of banking barriers  
  This section provides back-of-the-envelope calculations of the effects of barriers in terms 
of the percentage of the population in a country that cannot afford banking services.   
Specifically, we combine income and income distribution data with our information on annual 
fees to maintain checking and savings accounts to compute the share of the population that does 
not earn enough to afford using checking and saving accounts (see methodological explanation 
in the appendix). Using the latest income distribution data from UNU-WIDER (2005), we utilize 
information on the Gini coefficient to compute percentiles of income distribution and combine 
this with income data to compute income per capita data at different percentiles of the income 
distribution.
12 We follow Genesis (2005b) and assume that people cannot afford to spend more 
than 2% of their annual household income on financial services.
13 We adjust income with the 
average household size for every country.
14 These calculations provide us with a cut-off 
percentile of a country’s income distribution below which the use of checking and saving 
accounts is not affordable.      
Table 7 shows that while in terms of fees checking and savings accounts are affordable 
for almost the entire population in many countries, there are significant outliers. In ten countries 
at least 30% of the population cannot afford checking accounts and in several African countries, 
more than 50% of the population is priced-out of using these services.  Specifically, 54% of the 
population in Cameroon, 81% in Kenya, 40% in Madagascar, 94% in Malawi, 89% in Sierra 
                                                 
12 Calculations are based on Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Lopez and Serven (2006).  
13 According to Genesis (2005b), the 2% limit is based on unpublished research by the South African Universal 
Services Agency in the context of mandated rolling-out of telecom service to lower-income families.  As both 
financial transaction accounts and telecom service can be considered network products, similar assumptions on 
affordability for both services seem reasonable. 
14 Household size is expected to vary with income level within countries.  As we do not have data available on 
household size distribution, we are not able to adjust for this effect.  Again, our numbers are indicative and a more 
detailed analysis would require richer country-level information on the variation of household size distribution with 
income distribution.   19 
 
Leone and 93% in Uganda cannot afford the fees for checking accounts, given their annual 
income and assuming that they cannot spend more than 2% of household income on financial 
transaction account charges. The fees on savings accounts are in general less restrictive. 
Approximately, 33% of the population in Malawi and Uganda and 17% of the Bolivian 
population cannot afford the fees and charges associated with a savings account. 
  While these computations are rough estimates, they are most likely conservative 
estimates of the share of the population that cannot afford these services, as we do not take into 
account the costs imposed by minimum balances, restricted locations to access services, and 
documentation requirements.   
 
6. What explains banking barriers across banks and countries? 
This section explores which bank and country-level characteristics can explain the wide 
variation of barriers across countries. Theory suggests the importance of transaction costs, risk 
mitigation tools and market structure for the cost of financial services and thus barriers to 
banking.  Theory also suggests that different business strategies, the size of a bank and its 
ownership structure might impact its cost structure and, thus, the barriers imposed on customers.  
We therefore consider whether the size, business orientation and ownership of the banks are 
associated with barriers and explore the role of physical infrastructure, costs of doing business, 
the contractual and informational frameworks, banking sector market structure, competitiveness, 
openness, and transparency of the economy in explaining cross-country variation in banks’ 
barriers.  While bank-level data are from Bankscope, country-level variables are drawn from 
different databases.
15  Appendix Table A.2 shows definitions and sources for the explanatory 
                                                 
15 Bank ownership data are from Micco, Panizza and Yañez (2007), based on cleaned Bankscope data.   20 
 
variables included in the analysis and Tables A.3 and A.4 present descriptive statistics and 
correlations for all explanatory variables.  
To assess the relationship between barriers and bank- and country-level characteristics, 
we utilize the following regression model  
Fi,k =β0 + β1 Bi + β2 Ck + εi,k  ,                     (1) 
where F is one of the barriers indicators for bank i in country k, B is a matrix of bank-level 
variables (the log of total assets in U.S. dollars, dummy variables for government and foreign 
ownership and the loan to asset ratio), and C is a country-level variable. While we include all 
bank variables in our regressions, we include only one country-level variable at a time given the 
limited number of countries in our sample and the high correlation between our variables 
(Appendix Table A.4).  Critically, we do not control for GDP per capita because many of our 
explanatory country-level variables are highly correlated with economic development.  Also, we 
are interested primarily in which components of economic development can explain cross-
country variations in barriers, as captured by individual country characteristics.  
  We utilize different estimation techniques depending on the nature of the dependent 
variable.  Specifically, for all affordability indicators – constructed as minimum amounts and 
fees relative to GDP per capita-, we conduct OLS regressions of  the log of one plus the variable 
– to account for the skewed distribution of these variables. Similarly, for the days to process 
loans and documentation requirements to open an account, we use OLS regressions.  For the 
location variables (both for loans and deposits) capturing physical access, we utilize ordered 
probit estimations to take account of the polychotomous nature of these variables with natural 
order. In all cases, we drop the top 1% of the distribution of the dependent variables to control 
for outliers. The first four rows of Table 8 report the results of a regression on just the bank-level   21 
 
variables, while all subsequent rows report the results of adding the country-level variables one 
at a time. 
Theory provides opposing views on the impact of size, business orientation and 
ownership on barriers.  On the one hand, large banks might be better in exploiting scale 
economies, thus overcoming more easily the triple problem of smallness faced by financial 
systems in large parts of the developing world which have clients with demand for small and few 
transactions and have few customers over which fixed transaction costs can be spread (Beck and 
de la Torre, 2007). On the other hand, small banks might be closer to these “smaller” and riskier 
clients and/or orient themselves more towards them (Berger, Hasan and Klapper, 2004).  Banks 
that are less interested in retail business might impose higher barriers to signal this lack of 
interest to potential customers.  While the public-interest theory justifies the creation of 
government-owned banks with the necessity to target small and riskier clients ignored by private 
financial institutions, a large theoretical and empirical literature suggests a mission drift of these 
banks (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002), with both hypotheses having opposing 
implications for the barriers imposed by government-owned banks.  Finally, while foreign-
owned banks are assumed to be more interested in large corporates and private clients with 
demand for large transactions due to their limited access to soft local information (Mian, 2006), 
they might have more efficient technologies, which allows them to lower cost and thus barriers 
(Berger and Udell, 2006). We measure the size of banks with the log of total assets in millions of 
US dollars, the business orientation with the loan-asset ratio (Laeven and Levine, 2006) and their 
ownership with separate dummy variables for majority government- and foreign-owned banks.   
Our results suggest that larger banks demand lower minimum balances to open a 
checking or savings account, charge lower checking and savings fees, require fewer documents 
to open accounts, impose lower minimum loan amounts for SME and consumer loans, need   22 
 
fewer days to process loans, and are more likely to accept loan applications through non-
traditional channels such as phone or Internet.  We find that foreign banks appear to charge 
higher deposit fees and fees on consumer loans, while government-owned banks take longer to 
screen loan applications. The correlation between business orientation and barriers is mixed. 
While, retail, loan intensive banks – those with higher ratio of loans to assets - require lower 
minimum balances to open accounts, they ask for more documents to open accounts and take 
longer to process loan applications. Overall, these results suggest that size is the dominating bank 
characteristic in explaining variation in barriers. 
  While the academic literature has paid surprisingly little attention to the relationship 
between infrastructure, input costs and financial depth and breadth, our results suggest that the 
quality of physical infrastructure, such as communication and electricity networks, impacts the 
costs of doing business for banks and can explain cross-country variation in many barriers to 
banking.  We use two indicators to gauge the relationship between physical infrastructure and 
barriers to banking.  Specifically, we utilize telephones lines per capita and electric power 
transmission and distribution losses as percentage of output (Estache and Goicoechea, 2005).  
Our regression analysis suggests that banks in countries with better phone networks demand 
lower minimum amounts to open checking or savings accounts, charge lower account fees, 
require fewer documents to open accounts, allow loans to be submitted via multiple channels, 
require lower minimum loan amounts, are faster in processing loan applications and charge 
lower ATM fees.  Banks in countries with more power outages require higher minimum balances 
for savings accounts, charge higher checking account fees, require more documents to open 
accounts, impose higher minimum loan amounts, take longer to process loan applications and 
charge higher fees for international wire transfers.    23 
 
Theory suggests lower bank barriers in countries with more effective contractual and 
informational frameworks.  Banks arise to overcome asymmetric information between lenders 
and borrowers (Diamond 1984, 1991, Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984, Boyd and Prescott 1986), 
which leads to adverse selection and moral hazard problems, but the efficiency with which they 
are able to overcome these asymmetries, depends on the contractual and informational 
framework within which they operate.  Specifically, more efficient systems of credit information 
sharing allows banks to better assess loan applicants, thus potentially reducing reliance on non-
interest screening mechanisms such as minimum loan amounts and fees, while increasing the 
possibility to use less personal application channels such as phone or Internet and allowing for 
faster processing of loans.  More efficient systems of contract enforcement help banks overcome 
problems of moral hazard and again allow them to rely less on non-interest barriers and to 
process loans faster.  However, a more efficient contractual and information environment might 
also allow banks more easily to accept new deposit clients.  An extensive empirical literature has 
shown the importance of effective contractual and informational frameworks for financial sector 
depth (Beck and Levine, 2005).  There is empirical evidence that this relationship also holds for 
financial sector penetration and access to finance (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 
2007; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2005; Haselmann, Pistor and Vig, 2005; Visaria, 2006).  
Here we explore whether the contractual and informational frameworks have a similar 
importance for bank barriers. We utilize two indicators from the Doing Business database (World 
Bank, 2006a) that measure the efficiency of credit information systems and the cost of contract 
enforcement relative to GDP per capita.   
Our results suggest that banks in countries with more efficient systems of credit 
information sharing are more likely to accept deposits at multiple locations, require lower 
minimum balances and fewer documents to open accounts, allow for loan applications to be   24 
 
submitted through non-traditional channels, impose lower minimum balances on consumer loans, 
and take less time to process SME loan applications. On the other hand, surprisingly banks in 
countries with better informational environments seem to charge higher fees on consumer loans 
and on international transfers.  Banks in countries with poor systems of contract enforcement 
require higher minimum balances on savings accounts, charge higher fees on deposit accounts, 
require more documents to open accounts and impose higher minimum loan balances.   The 
significant relationship between the efficiency of contractual and informational frameworks and 
lower barriers to banking thus matches the positive relationship between these institutions and 
aggregate financial development, established by the literature (Beck and Levine, 2005).  We 
note, however, that it is mostly the barrier to deposit services that are significantly correlated 
with the contractual and informational framework rather than barriers to lending services, as one 
would have expected from the theoretical literature.  
Theory does not suggest an unambiguous relationship between market structure and 
barriers to banking. Banks in more concentrated banking systems might either exploit their 
market power imposing higher barriers or alternatively, might face higher incentives to lend to 
smaller, more opaque borrowers such as SMEs as they can recover investment in the relationship 
in future periods (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Further, the variation of barriers across countries 
might be affected by the dominance of government-owned or foreign-owned banks in a banking 
system; banks might impose higher or lower barriers in banking systems dominated by 
government-owned or foreign-owned banks, independent of what individual banks’ own 
ownership structure is.  Specifically, competitive pressures or the lack thereof from a 
predominantly government-owned or foreign-owned banking system can push individual banks 
towards higher or lower banking barriers.  We use data from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) to 
assess the relationship between ownership and market structure and barriers to banking.     25 
 
Though we found that foreign banks themselves seem to charge higher fees than other 
banks, in foreign dominated banking systems fees are lower (perhaps because of greater 
competitive pressures) and it is easier to open bank accounts. On the other hand, in systems that 
are predominantly government-owned, customers face lower fees but also face greater 
restrictions in terms of where to apply for loans and the time it takes to have applications 
processed is longer. Finally, banks in countries with more concentrated banking systems are less 
likely to allow customers to open deposit accounts outside headquarters but impose lower 
minimum amounts for SME loans, are faster at processing loan applications and charge lower 
ATM fees.  
As recent empirical work has shown that competition is not a linear and unambiguous 
function of banking sector structure (Claessens and Laeven, 2004), we also explore the 
relationship between banking barriers and two indicators of an economy’s competitiveness.   
First, we use the index on Banking Restrictions from the Heritage Foundation, a composite index 
of whether foreign banks are able to operate freely, how difficult it is to open domestic banks, 
what degree of regulations there are on financial market activities, the presence of state-owned 
banks, whether the government influences allocation of credit, and whether banks are free to 
provide customers with insurance products and invest in securities.  Second, we use the cost of 
starting a formal enterprise, as share of income per capita, as an indicator of the ease of entry into 
the economy (World Bank, 2006a).
16   
Less competitive economies have banks that impose higher barriers to banking.  We find 
that banks in economies with more restrictions to banking freedom are less likely to allow that 
accounts are opened outside the headquarters, demand higher minimum balances to open a 
checking or savings account, impose higher fees on checking accounts, require more 
                                                 
16 We also tried regulatory indicators of bank entry, but these refer to regulatory requirements rather than the cost of 
setting up banks.    26 
 
documentation to open these accounts, are less likely to accept loan applications through non-
traditional channels, impose higher minimum balances on consumer loans, and are slower at 
processing loan applications. Banks in economies where entry into the corporate sector is more 
costly are less likely to allow customers to open accounts outside headquarters, charge higher 
fees on checking accounts, require a greater number of documents to open accounts, charge 
higher fees for SME loans and for using ATM cards, and take longer for processing consumer 
loans. 
  More transparent societies might allow for lower barriers to banking, as banks in 
economies where clients have more access to information might have less leeway to impose high 
barriers to banking.  More transparency might also imply a higher degree of competition, as 
customers can more easily compare products across banks.  To gauge the relationship between 
transparency and bank barriers, we use a bank disclosure index (World Bank, 2006b) that 
captures how informative banks’ balance sheet and income statements are.  While this indicator 
was constructed to assess to what extent banks include information relating to their risk-taking 
and thus stability, it might indicate the general transparency of banking. We also utilize an 
indicator of media freedom, which measures the share of press outlets that are owned by the 
government. This indicator comes from Djankov et al. (2003), who show a negative association 
between this and other measures of media freedom with economic and political freedom.   
Our results suggest that banks in countries with higher disclosure standards require lower 
minimum balances to open a checking account and charge lower fees on these accounts, require 
fewer documents to open such an account, are more likely to accept loan applications through 
non-traditional channels such as phone or Internet, need fewer days to process loan applications, 
and charge lower fees for using ATMs. Banks in countries with lower degrees of media freedom 
(i.e., where a greater share is controlled by the government) restrict the locations where accounts   27 
 
might be opened, impose higher minimum balances to open accounts, require more documents to 
open checking or savings accounts, need more days to process loan applications, and are less 
likely to accept loan applications through non-traditional channels. 
Overall, we find many country characteristics associated with barriers to banking 
services.  Improvements in physical infrastructure and more efficient credit information and 
contract enforcement frameworks are associated with lower barriers.  Barriers are also lower in 
countries with greater banking freedoms, greater competition and transparency.  Although 
foreign banks themselves charge higher fees, banking systems with greater foreign entry have 
lower barriers in general. While government banks themselves do not seem to provide improved 
access, in banking systems dominated by state banks customers face lower fees but poorer 
quality of service (fewer locations that accept loan applications, longer loan processing times). 
These results have important policy implications for potential reforms to broaden access.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper is the first effort to systematically document the existence of barriers to 
banking services. Using surveys of 193 banks in 58 countries, our data show significant variation 
in barriers to banking across countries.  Though not without limitations, we think that this effort 
is important in identifying and understanding the channels through which financial exclusion 
works.  Barriers like high minimum deposit balances, minimum loan amounts and fees can lead 
to exclusion by making these products unaffordable for large shares of the population.  For 
example, in our sample high fees on checking and savings accounts effectively exclude more 
than 30 percent of the population from having a checking account in ten of our 58 countries.  
Also, strict documentation requirements and long processing times can exclude households and 
firms that cannot provide these documents or that depend on faster loan decisions.  Similarly,   28 
 
geographic centralization of deposit and loan decisions at headquarters reduces physical access 
and increases the opportunity costs for households and firms to access financial services.  
Finally, we conducted a first-cut examination of the bank and country-level factors that 
explain variation in indicators of bank barriers.  We provide suggestive evidence that variation in 
these barriers is associated with variation in bank size, physical infrastructure, contractual and 
informational frameworks, ownership structure in banking and the general degree of 
competitiveness, openness and transparency of economies. While much more research is needed 
in this area, these results have important implications for policy reforms to broaden access. 
As a first attempt at capturing quantitative measures of cross-country differences in 
barriers to banking along the dimensions of physical access, affordability and eligibility, this 
paper is complementary to other efforts to collect data on access to financial services at the 
aggregate, firm- and household levels. We are still very much in the beginning of this work and 
richer data sources and in-depth analysis are needed to improve our understanding of access and 
its impact on economic outcomes.  Going forward, several fruitful approaches can be envisioned.  
First, the type of analysis conducted in this paper is very useful in identifying outlier countries, 
i.e. those with high access barriers, as potential case studies to investigate financial access in 
greater depth.  Case studies for individual countries that combine detailed supply and demand 
data from financial institutions, households and firms would be able to more thoroughly assess 
access to and use of financial services, barriers faced by different users, and potential policies to 
reduce these barriers. Compared to cross-country studies, such country-case studies can better 
take into account idiosyncratic characteristics and better exploit the richness of institutional 
detail at and below the country level.  
Second, while household and firm surveys at the country level are useful instruments, 
important empirical challenges remain in measuring the causal impact of improved access to   29 
 
credit and deposit services on economic outcomes.  Individuals and firms seeking to borrow or 
open bank accounts are typically different than non-borrowers, which makes causality inference 
from cross-sectional data very difficult.  However, these identification issues may be 
circumvented by introducing a random component to the assignment of financial products such 
as subsidizing account opening fees or random variation in certain terms of the loan contract.  
Such randomized field experiments are likely to shed light on the impact of removing barriers on 
real outcomes.  
Third, careful cross-country studies focusing on specific standardized banking products, 
to the extent they exist, such as transaction accounts or consumer and SME loans would also be 
valuable since they allow for greater uniformity in the analysis across countries. We leave these 
complementary efforts for future research.    30 
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2004 2004  2004  2004    
Albania   8.65%  1,477  91.42%  64.24%  5 
Algeria   10.27%  1,982  34.43%  37.08%  1 
Armenia   6.26%  952  59.63%  47.28%  4 
Australia   100.94%  22,083  32.59%  33.59%  2 
Bangladesh   27.41%  402  56.98%  56.51%  5 
Belarus   n.a.  1,695  74.58%  71.63%  3 
Belgium   72.78%  23,213  72.56%  68.57%  3 
Bolivia   42.31%  1,034  58.04%  58.87%  4 
Bosnia Herzegovina  n.a.  1,406  64.04%  58.96%  4 
Brazil   33.89%  3,564  64.35%  48.61%  4 
Bulgaria   30.86%  1,957  34.87%  31.65%  3 
Cameroon   8.41%  662  83.83%  81.36%  5 
Chile   70.99%  5,462  35.50%  36.05%  2 
Colombia   21.80%  2,091  50.48%  45.65%  5 
Croatia   54.18%  4,934  63.42%  63.69%  4 
Czech Republic   30.66%  6,123  43.00%  43.00%  2 
Denmark   154.04%  30,735  72.71%  48.81%  2 
Dominican Republic   30.89%  2,476  39.27%  42.61%  2 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  54.84%  1,615  32.05%  32.08%  2 
Ethiopia   23.00%  113  93.73%  85.37%  4 
France   88.19%  23,432  26.23%  30.08%  2 
Georgia   8.64%  883  85.71%  80.26%  5 
Germany   113.07%  23,705  31.91%  23.72%  3 
Ghana   11.98%  278  69.49%  68.72%  4 
Greece   72.52%  11,960  56.92%  58.36%  3 
Hungary   43.65%  5,413  53.09%  42.43%  3 
India   32.78%  538  36.87%  37.75%  4 
Indonesia   20.99%  906  44.73%  40.38%  4 
Israel   90.04%  17,788  36.17%  34.75%  2 
Jordan   68.83%  1,940  83.61%  80.36%  3 
Kenya   25.33%  427  43.82%  47.61%  3 
 
         n.a. means not available.  34 
 

























2004  2004 2004 2004    
Korea,  Rep.  125.43%  12,752 68.95% 73.54% 6 
Lebanon    n.a. 5,606 38.00% 38.00% 3 
Lithuania    22.21% 4,402 88.87% 86.77% 5 
Madagascar    8.65%  229 72.44% 74.59% 5 
Malawi    8.33%  153 82.36% 59.73% 3 
Malta    106.72% 9,435 44.56% 58.34% 4 
Mexico    15.96% 5,968 48.95% 45.74% 3 
Moldova    19.41%  400 40.16% 48.32% 3 
Mozambique    2.07%  275 48.78% 40.34% 2 
Nigeria    15.47%  402 32.22% 29.31% 3 
Pakistan    25.74%  566 47.50% 44.02% 3 
Peru    18.85% 2,206 81.88% 76.40% 4 
Philippines    33.48% 1,085 41.84% 43.17% 4 
Romania    8.78% 2,163 35.01% 24.66% 4 
Sierra  Leone    3.92%  156 100.00% 100.00%  4 
Slovak Republic   30.40%  4,495  58.12%  51.93%  3 
Slovenia    42.62%  10,860 67.48% 70.68% 5 
South Africa   134.13%  3,312  70.09%  69.39%  3 
Spain    115.46%  15,343 63.75% 66.73% 4 
Sri Lanka   28.48%  962  52.19%  51.10%  3 
Swaziland    14.08% 1,357 43.40% 29.19% 1 
Sweden    102.82%  28,858 39.47% 22.43% 2 
Switzerland    157.25%  34,340 79.57% 59.19% 2 
Trinidad and Tobago   30.26%  8,055  40.15%  50.27%  3 
Turkey    17.09% 3,197 50.14% 38.33% 3 
Uganda    5.92%  267 59.27% 46.87% 3 
Zimbabwe  16.58%  457 28.24% 43.45% 4 
 
   n.a. means not available.   35 
 
























































(out of 5) 




 (out of 5) 
Albania 2.73  0.85  6.08  0.85 6.08 0.19  0.39  1.00 1.00 
Algeria 2.00  0.00  n.a.  0.00 n.a.  0.12 0.00  3.00 1.00 
Armenia 1.81  10.97  15.25  10.56 15.25 0.35  0.00  2.85  2.19 
Australia 2.59  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.16  0.10  3.00 3.00 
Bangladesh 2.00 2.28  0.89  2.28 0.79 0.00  0.00  4.57 4.57 
Belarus 2.71  0.00  0.04  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  1.44 1.00 
Belgium 2.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.09  0.00  1.80 1.80 
Bolivia 2.00  17.40  0.81  25.44  3.93 0.83  1.78  2.53 2.33 
Bosnia Herzegovina  2.60  0.04  0.04  0.19 0.15 0.34  0.35  1.74 1.34 
Brazil 2.44  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.00 0.81  0.03  2.67 2.16 
Bulgaria 2.02  0.59  0.88  0.59 0.91 0.14  0.00  1.72 1.72 
Cameroon 1.88  116.39  68.26  55.88 64.75 7.87  1.22  4.00  3.11 
Chile 2.42  4.33  0.00  0.00  0.00 3.38  0.42  4.42 1.58 
Colombia 1.93  8.78  1.22  0.00 0.18 0.78  0.56  3.08 2.25 
Croatia 2.63  0.00  1.19  0.00 0.00 0.07  0.00  2.16 2.00 
Czech Republic  2.00  0.23  1.41  0.00 1.24 0.26  0.00  1.00 1.00 
Denmark 2.32  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.09  0.00  1.32 1.32 
Dominican Rep.  2.67  2.94  0.70  0.58 0.41 0.66  0.00  2.66 1.99 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  2.00  0.35  0.00 0.18  0.18  0.40  0.07  n.a.  n.a. 
Ethiopia 1.92  55.41  5.50  n.a. 5.11 0.00  0.00  3.77 2.14 
France  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. n.a. 
Georgia 2.56  0.00  33.18  0.00 8.09 0.33  0.33  1.66 1.78 
Germany 2.65  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00 0.26  0.00  n.a.  n.a. 
Ghana 2.15  22.69  21.89  0.09  11.99 5.90  0.58 3.62  3.24 
Greece 1.21  0.64  1.27  0.64  1.27 0.02  0.02  2.53 2.26 
Hungary 2.53  0.14  2.04  0.00 0.82 0.17  0.00  1.55 1.00 
India 2.00  8.85  5.02  5.83  5.02 0.00  0.17  2.69 2.55 
Indonesia 2.53  9.54  3.03  6.14 0.65 2.80  0.66  3.18 2.66 
Israel 2.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.04  0.00  1.22 n.a. 
Jordan 1.93  16.55  5.34  1.73 0.87 0.00  0.00  2.04 2.04 
Kenya 2.78  11.71  44.30  0.00  41.82 12.82  2.07 3.78  2.86 
n.a. means not available because the banks that responded to the survey account for less than 30 percent of the market   36 
 

























































(out of 5) 
No. of docs to 
open savings  
account 
 (out of 5) 
Korea, Rep.  2.11  3.32  0.01  0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00  1.94 1.20 
Lebanon 1.58  4.22  23.98  4.22  23.98 1.96  1.90  2.54  2.36 
Lithuania 2.71  0.00  1.45  0.00 1.55 0.01 0.00  1.59 1.00 
Madagascar 1.95  38.86  19.35  0.00 17.59  5.15 0.00  2.94 2.71 
Malawi 2.00  0.00  17.89  0.00 17.89  21.98  3.63  3.65 2.84 
Malta 2.00  0.22  0.71  0.00  0.68 0.00  0.00  3.17 3.07 
Mexico 2.18  1.11  0.62  0.90 0.67 0.43 0.18  2.80 2.18 
Moldova 3.00  0.00  13.13  0.00 8.26 0.53 0.00  2.31 2.06 
Mozambique 2.00 29.61  15.71  14.19 7.20  n.a.  0.30 1.00  1.00 
Nigeria 2.44  106.42  22.07  0.00 1.96 0.05 0.00  3.66 1.99 
Pakistan 2.00  1.59  1.59  0.33 0.71 0.00 0.00  2.64 2.43 
Peru 2.00  1.66  0.53  0.00  0.00 1.44  0.50  2.42 1.87 
Philippines 2.00  14.54  11.88  14.54 11.88 0.00  0.00 3.17  2.20 
Romania 2.30  0.03  0.71  0.02  0.18 0.40  0.23  1.28 n.a. 
Sierra Leone  1.42  51.63  44.89  8.81 43.56  26.63  0.00  4.02 3.88 
Slovak Republic  2.08  0.12  0.79  0.10 0.79 0.18 0.01  1.47 1.51 
Slovenia 1.50  0.01  0.03  0.01 0.02 0.17 0.00  1.88 1.88 
South Africa  2.27  0.00  1.06  0.00 0.28 2.13 0.91  3.45 3.07 
Spain 1.53  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.19  0.04  1.00 1.00 
Sri Lanka  1.80  15.76  3.54  4.77 0.84 0.73 0.00  2.62 1.00 
Swaziland 2.00  0.00  0.48  0.00 0.48 7.24 1.09  3.00 3.00 
Sweden 1.66  0.00  0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 1.00 
Switzerland 2.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00  1.14 1.14 
Trinidad Tobago  2.00  1.37  0.42  1.28 0.49 0.35 0.00  4.29 3.07 
Turkey 2.20  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.30 0.14  3.20 2.40 
Uganda 2.00  51.12  48.62  1.73 29.52  24.88  3.37  4.00 3.00 
Zimbawe  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. 
                         
Minimum 1.21  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 1.00 
5th percentile  1.53  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 1.00 
Median 2.00  0.62  1.06  0.00 0.71 0.26 0.00  2.63 2.10 
Average 2.14  10.93  8.14  2.94 6.15 2.43 0.38  2.54 2.09 
Maximum 3.00  116.39  68.26  55.88 64.75 26.63 3.63 4.57  4.57 
95th percentile  2.71  52.57  44.48 14.30  33.21  15.56  1.94  4.12  3.17 
n.a. means not available because the banks that responded to the survey account for less than 30 percent of the market   37 
 











































Albania 2.03  214.29  3.45 1358.23  1.00 9.64  14.50 
Algeria 2.00  45.46  0.00 0.00 0.00 8.00  30.00 
Armenia 2.00  14.74  9.41 860.58  0.19 4.83  7.62 
Australia 5.00  7.31  1.41  10.06 16.66 1.00  7.19 
Bangladesh 2.12  25.70  0.51 9696.58  0.15 9.44  43.26 
Belarus n.a.  3.28  n.a. 0.00  n.a. 8.06  6.20 
Belgium 2.45  5.34  0.00 28.29  8.95 2.70  3.60 
Bolivia 2.74  109.00  3.14 795.48  0.81 5.36  9.70 
Bosnia Herzegovina  2.73  18.54  1.47 711.11  1.20 5.36  8.86 
Brazil  4.85  1.96 5.87 8.08 2.94 1.00  3.63 
Bulgaria 3.42  14.24  1.45 95.79  2.05 4.88  13.38 
Cameroon 2.14  78.53  9.71 947.92  4.26 4.87  9.31 
Chile 5.00  8.29  24.50  121.70 n.a.  3.84  13.87 
Colombia 3.47  16.40  4.51 242.96  0.23 2.51  8.22 
Croatia 3.43  3.90  1.76 22.58  0.94 2.42  4.65 
Czech  Republic  3.13  10.22  0.70 4.96 0.70 1.00  10.84 
Denmark 5.00  0.00  2.00 0.00 1.73 0.73  1.00 
Dominican Rep.  4.67  13.02 21.05 43.52 29.32 1.84  13.04 
Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  2.81  5.84 1.65 0.00 0.88 5.38  14.43 
Ethiopia 2.00  178.16  0.00 878.77  0.64 5.41  14.55 
France 4.00  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. n.a. 4.87  10.00 
Georgia 2.46  34.53  1.40 2480.08  0.99 3.31  5.62 
Germany  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. 
Ghana  2.63  111.94  2.86 1448.07  1.31 9.50  29.20 
Greece  5.00  11.99 3.65  33.96 7.08  1.00  2.23 
Hungary 3.29  4.77  3.74 58.00  3.31 5.66  7.66 
India  2.44  28.79  1.19 145.17  0.93 4.17  10.75 
Indonesia 3.10  31.68  n.a.  n.a. n.a. 4.94  9.68 
Israel 4.58  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.00  1.79 
Jordan  2.05  147.67 1.33  445.26 1.02  2.68  7.91 
Kenya 3.27  186.42  1.84  166.44 1.57  2.52  5.66 
n.a. means not available because the banks that responded to the survey account for less than 30 percent of the market   38 
 











































Korea, Rep.  3.78  4.19  3.05 16.99  1.07 1.88  2.73 
Lebanon 4.60  32.95  1.45  1154.76 1.29  1.58  15.61 
Lithuania 4.25  6.31  2.77 17.54  0.88 2.41  8.62 
Madagascar 2.16  24.06  1.43 17.27  2.46 8.55  15.46 
Malawi 2.12  222.36  1.00  n.a. 1.32  1.72  n.a. 
Malta 4.20  19.26  3.52  355.91 0.28  1.34  5.69 
Mexico 4.20  7.54  1.81 87.80  1.27 5.01  9.86 
Moldova 2.54  31.11  3.34 71.78  1.34 1.36  4.31 
Mozambique 2.15  30.71  n.a. 28.61  n.a. 8.66  25.84 
Nigeria  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. 
Pakistan 3.09  146.71  n.a. 234.25  n.a. 20.71 33.63 
Peru 3.21  21.08  19.21  54.35 0.16  1.94  3.71 
Philippines 2.36  330.55  1.39 916.66  n.a.  10.13  33.29 
Romania  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. 
Sierra Leone  1.77  143.55  2.07 243.89  1.76 1.73  9.52 
Slovak Republic  3.64  10.26  n.a. 57.89  1.23  1.75  3.54 
Slovenia 2.13  1.13  1.22 5.21 0.38 1.13  3.89 
South Africa  5.00  7.27  4.38 15.98  1.56 1.46  4.13 
Spain 5.00  9.95  1.85  19.35 1.06  1.00  1.83 
Sri Lanka  2.90  36.10  0.24 20.56  n.a.  7.34  10.04 
Swaziland n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. 
Sweden  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. 
Switzerland 3.12  0.11  0.00 11.28  0.00 1.44  3.24 
Trinidad  Tobago  4.62  7.71 1.33 8.30 1.24 1.33  7.32 
Turkey 4.15  11.83  4.74 18.57  1.94 2.94  4.61 
Uganda 2.00  205.75  2.68 3141.17  1.51 1.38  4.47 
Zimbawe 2.85  24.08  3.05 240.12  2.54 1.46  3.91 
                 
Minimum 1.77 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73  1.00 
5th percentile  2.00  1.55 0.00 0.00 0.15 1.00  2.05 
Median  3.11  18.54  1.84 58  1.24 2.68  8.06 
Average  3.26  52.29  3.68 558  2.55 4.08  10.45 
Maximum 5.00 330.55  24.50 9696.58  29.32 20.71  43.26 
95th percentile  5.00  210.02 16.83  2067.28  8.67  9.56  31.48 
n.a. means not available because the banks that responded to the survey account for less than 30 percent of the market 
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Table 4: Indicators of barriers to payment services 
PAYMENT SERVICES 
Affordability 
Country  Cost  to transfer 
funds 
internationally 
(% of 250 
dollars) 
Amount of fee 
for using  
ATM Cards 
(% of 100 
dollars) 
Country  Cost  to transfer 
funds 
internationally 
(% of 250 
dollars) 
Amount of fee 
for using  
ATM Cards 
(% of 100 
dollars) 
Albania  7.70 0.00 Korea,  Rep.  7.05 0.22 
Algeria  n.a.  0.21 Lebanon  9.76 0.00 
Armenia  6.14 0.07 Lithuania 8.72    
Australia 8.05  0.00  Madagascar 4.30  0.00 
Bangladesh 1.93 n.a. Malawi  6.42 0.08 
Belarus  1.27 0.00 Malta  5.59 0.03 
Belgium 0.12  0.00  Mexico  n.a  0.40 
Bolivia 13.47  0.26  Moldova  11.19  0.00 
Bosnia Herzegovina  3.79  0.01  Mozambique  n.a  n.a 
Brazil 14.85  0.11  Nigeria  n.a  0.50 
Bulgaria 5.24  0.13  Pakistan  n.a  0.60 
Cameroon  9.15 0.00 Peru  6.68 0.24 
Chile n.a.  0.00  Philippines  n.a  0.00 
Colombia n.a.  0.19  Romania  n.a.  n.a. 
Croatia  3.57 0.00 Sierra  Leone  6.86 0.00 
Czech Republic  3.99  0.19  Slovak Rep.  4.38  0.19 
Denmark  4.09 0.00 Slovenia  2.88 0.00 
Dominican Republic  20.00  n.a. South  Africa  9.53  0.34 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  0.76  0.00  Spain  6.39  0.00 
Ethiopia 1.87  0.00  Sri  Lanka  n.a.  n.a. 
France n.a.  n.a.  Swaziland  14.40  n.a. 
Georgia  7.03 0.13 Sweden  8.16 0.00 
Germany n.a.  n.a.  Switzerland  3.17  0.00 
Ghana  14.70  0.19  Trinidad and Tobago  3.74  0.05 
Greece  7.42 0.00 Turkey  6.34 0.00 
Hungary 3.60  n.a.  Uganda  0.55  0.19 
India 6.49  0.00  Zimbawe  n.a.  n.a. 
Indonesia  2.83  0.00         
Israel  n.a.  0.23 Minimum 0.12 0.00 
Jordan  5.37 0.00 5th  percentile  0.83 0.00 
Kenya  8.43 0.15 Median  6.36 0.00 
     Average  6.54  0.10 
     Maximum  20.00  0.60 
     95th  percentile  14.66  0.38 
n.a. means not available because the banks that responded to the survey account for less than 30 percent of the 
market   40 
 
Table 5: Correlations between indicators of barriers 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Minimum Balance to 
Open Checking Account  
(% of GDPPC) 
-0.013                
Minimum Balance to 
Open Savings Account  
(% of GDPPC) 
-0.054  0.748***               
Annual Checking  Fees  
(% of GDPPC)  -0.134*  0.242***  0.361***              
Annual Savings Fees  (% 
of GDPPC)  -0.06  0.011  0.056  0.315***             
Number of Documents to 
Open Checking Account  
(Out of 5) 
-0.118  0.196***  0.163**  0.283***  0.187**            
Number of Documents to 
Open Savings Account  
(Out of 5) 
-0.109  0.217***  0.205***  0.272***  0.266***  0.779***           
Locations  to Submit 
Loan Applications  
(out of 5) 
0.149**  -0.148**  -0.153**  -0.217***  -0.046  -0.085  -0.13*          
Minimum Amount 
Consumer Loans (% of 
GDPPC) 
-0.052  0.246***  0.391***  0.226***  0.085  0.157**  0.159**  -0.231***         
Minimum Amount SME 
Loans (% of GDPPC)  0.005 0.072 0.13* 0.03  0.023 0.063 0.09  -0.113  0.098            
Fees Consumer Loan (% 
of Minimum Loan 
Amount) 
0.033  -0.059 -0.043 -0.014 -0.019 0.027  -0.14* 0.028  -0.107 -0.064          
Fees SME Loan (% of 
Minimum Loan Amount)  0.064  -0.037 -0.031 0.023  0.006  -0.002 -0.025 0.215***  -0.085 -0.061 0.265***         
Days to Process 
Consumer Loan 
Applications 
-0.119  0.095 0.067 -0.048  -0.108  0.124*  0.122 -0.252***  0.404***  0.095 -0.041  -0.077       
Days to Process SME 
Loan Applications  -0.12 0.021 0.065 0.06  -0.073  0.214***  0.223***  -0.282***  0.301***  0.387***  -0.087  -0.066  0.65***     
Cost to Transfer Funds 
Internationally (% of 250)  0.069  -0.094 0.027  0.059  0.037  -0.008 -0.008 0.134* -0.016 -0.068 0.219***  0.214***  -0.023 -0.033  
Fees  for  Using  ATM  Card  -0.026 0.039  -0.011 0.069  0.076  0.168**  0.182**  -0.019 -0.017 -0.025 -0.025 -0.067 -0.039 -0.056 0.267***   41 
 
Table 6. Correlations between barriers indicators and measures of financial and economic development and financial outreach 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 























Locations to Open a Deposit Account  
(Out of 3) 
-0.106 -0.077 -0.199 -0.394*  -0.245 0.011  0.033 
Minimum Balance to Open Checking Account  
(% of GDPPC) 
-0.283** -0.319** -0.291** -0.342  -0.467***  0.371**  0.381** 
Minimum Balance to Open Savings Account  
(% of GDPPC) 
-0.33**  -0.446***  -0.292** -0.315  -0.432** 0.403**  0.482*** 
Annual Checking Fees  
(% of GDPPC) 
-0.248*  -0.297**  -0.213 -0.202 -0.317*  0.368**  0.513*** 
Annual Savings Fees 
(% of GDPPC) 
-0.255*  -0.219 -0.231 -0.264 -0.405**  0.285* 0.415** 
Number of Documents to Open Checking Account 
(Out of 5) 
-0.438*** -0.289**  -0.392*** -0.181  -0.411**  0.4**  0.272 
Number of Documents to Open Savings Account 
(Out of 5) 
-0.306**  -0.201 -0.273*  -0.168 -0.346*  0.36** 0.319* 
Locations to Submit a Loan Application  
(Out of 5) 
0.433*** 0.564*** 0.421*** 0.67***  0.466*** -0.378** -0.378** 
Minimum SME Loan Amount  
(% of GDPPC) 
-0.203 -0.193 -0.187 -0.224 -0.28  0.263  0.212 
Minimum Consumer Loan Amount  
(% of GDPPC) 
-0.348** -0.325** -0.29*  -0.387*  -0.452** 0.203  0.253 
Fees for SME Loan  
(% of Minimum Loan Amount) 
0.159 0.088 0.111 -0.016  0.115 -0.091  -0.034 
Fees for Consumer Loan  
(% of Minimum Loan Amount) 
-0.157 -0.052 -0.129 0.077  -0.132 0.015  -0.048 
Days to Process Consumer Loan Application  -0.355***  -0.369** -0.301** -0.413*  -0.418** 0.226  0.19 
Days to Process SME Loan Application  -0.372***  -0.394***  -0.313** -0.412*  -0.405** 0.318*  0.313* 
Cost to Transfer Funds Internationally  
(% of 250) 
-0.192 -0.103 -0.116 -0.091 -0.278 -0.002 0.127 
Fees  for  using  ATM  cards  -0.279**  -0.32**  -0.3** -0.263 -0.305 0.109  0.171   42 
 
 
Table 7. Back-of-the envelope calculations of the share of the population that cannot afford deposit accounts 
  
Lowest percentile for which 
fee is more than 2% of HH 
income 




Annual Fee  
(in 2003 USD) 
Savings 
Account 
Annual Fee  
(in 2003 USD) 
GDP per capita 
 (in 2003 USD) 
Gini Coefficient 





Albania  4.24  3.44 7.06 1811.11  0.28  1  1 
Algeria  4.85  2.56 0.00 2134.54  0.35  1  0 
Armenia  4.12  3.23 0.00 924.23  0.36  1  0 
Australia  3.84  42.46 26.54 26539.40  0.31  1  1 
Bangladesh  4.80  0.00 0.00 380.00  0.32  0  0 
Belarus    0.00 0.00 1805.30  0.25     
Belgium 2.56  26.39  0.00  29320.13  0.29  1  0 
Bolivia 4.18  7.60  16.30  915.90  0.53  5  17 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina    6.16 6.34 1811.88  0.26     
Brazil 3.79  22.58  0.84  2787.90  0.61  12  1 
Bulgaria  2.71  3.57 0.00 2548.76  0.37  1  0 
Cameroon  5.17  68.32 10.59 868.16  0.44  54  3 
Chile 3.44  156.16  19.40  4620.02  0.57  48  4 
Colombia  4.78  14.01 10.06 1795.65  0.57  6  4 
Croatia  3.00  4.54 0.00 6484.10  0.31  1  0 
Czech Republic  2.43  23.09 0.00  8880.78  0.23  1  0 
Denmark 2.18  35.26  0.00  39181.91  0.35  1  0 
Dominican Republic  3.90  12.47  0.00  1889.28  0.48  2  0 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  4.67  4.65  0.81  1163.56  0.38  1  1 
Ethiopia  4.83  0.00 0.00 115.75  0.30  0  0 
France  2.53    29805.15  0.27    
Georgia  3.52  2.89 2.89 874.42  0.45  1  1 
Germany 2.29  76.97  0.00  29602.50  0.28  1  0 
Ghana 5.11  21.21  2.08  359.43  0.41  37  1 
Greece  2.99  3.14 3.14 15700.09 0.32  1  1 
Hungary 2.67  13.95  0.00  8208.52  0.27  1  0 
India  5.31  0.00 0.96 564.32  0.26  0  1 
Indonesia 3.97  30.97  7.30  1105.94  0.34  10  1 
Israel  3.50  6.60 0.00 16493.07 0.37  1  0 
Jordan  6.16  0.00 0.00 1978.74  0.36  0  0 
Kenya 4.55  58.89  9.51  459.35  0.45  81  10 
Korea,  Rep.  4.41  7.63 0.00 12709.67 0.37  1  0   43 
 
Table 7. Back-of-the envelope calculations of the share of the population that cannot afford deposit accounts (cont.) 
 
Lowest percentile for 
which fee is more than 
2% of HH income 




 (in 2003 USD) 
Savings 
Account 
Annual Fee  
(in 2003 USD) 
GDP per 
capita 











Lebanon   111.77  108.35  5702.64  0.60     
Lithuania  2.57 0.54  0.00 5369.39  0.36  1  0 
Madagascar  4.89 15.99  0.00 310.57  0.47  40  0 
Malawi  4.37 31.43  5.19 143.01  0.49  94  33 
Malta            
Mexico 4.38  27.20  11.39  6326.51  0.51  2  1 
Moldova   2.48  0.00  468.16  0.44     
Mozambique  4.43   0.75 251.18  0.39   1 
Nigeria  4.97 0.23  0.00 462.98  0.50  1  0 
Pakistan  6.80 0.00  0.00 554.77  0.31  0  0 
Peru   32.23  11.19  2238.11  0.49     
Philippines  5.31 0.00  0.00 1004.02  0.50  0  0 
Romania  3.13 10.95  6.30 2736.97  0.29  1  1 
Sierra  Leone  6.76 51.48  0.00 193.32  0.64  89  0 
Slovak Republic    10.93  0.61  6071.99  0.27     
Slovenia  3.07 23.91  0.00 14064.90  0.22  1  0 
South Africa  4.00  77.23  33.00  3625.87  0.60  31  12 
Spain  3.28 39.85  8.39 20974.39  0.31  1  1 
Sri  Lanka  3.84 6.92  0.00 947.72  0.47  2  0 
Swaziland 5.39  124.85  18.80  1724.49  0.60  61  10 
Sweden  2.04 0.00  0.00 33670.48  0.26  0  0 
Switzerland  2.42 35.08  0.00 43847.96  0.17  1  0 
Trinidad and Tobago  3.68  29.04  0.00  8296.73  0.40  1  0 
Turkey  5.05 10.20  4.76 3399.36  0.40  1  1 
Uganda  4.86 57.92  7.84 232.79  0.55  93  33 
Zimbabwe 4.81      615.20  0.73     
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Table 8. Bank-level Regression Results 
Table shows results of regressing each indicator against the four bank-level variables (two ownership dummies, loan to assets and log of assets) along with one country level variable at a 
time. Regressions are estimated via OLS in all cases except for regressions on the number of places to open a deposit account and the number of places to submit a loan application where 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Dummy  [0.255] [0.214] [0.172] [0.101] [0.038] [0.065] [0.063] [0.253] [0.377] [0.529] [0.197] [0.151] [0.736] [2.427]  [0.164]  [0.039] 




Dummy  [0.225] [0.283] [0.262] [0.214] [0.095] [0.071] [0.066] [0.219] [0.284] [0.540] [0.147] [0.127] [0.758] [1.790]  [0.164]  [0.036] 
0.087  -0.752 -1.268**  -0.162 -0.117 0.323* 0.095  1.113**  -0.37  0.843  -0.072 -0.271 3.195* 1.329  -0.265  -0.023  Bank-level 
Loans / Assets 
[0.589] [0.604] [0.504] [0.364] [0.165] [0.176] [0.163] [0.557] [0.780] [1.250] [0.414] [0.310] [1.701] [4.238]  [0.349]  [0.093] 
-0.012  -0.208*** -0.217*** -0.119*** -0.022**  -0.031*** -0.025**  0.239***  -0.276*** -0.283*** -0.006  -0.007  -0.408*** -0.818*** 0.029  -0.002  Bank-level 
Log(Total 
Assets)  [0.043] [0.040] [0.031] [0.024] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.040] [0.055] [0.081] [0.023] [0.021] [0.114] [0.229]  [0.027] [0.005] 
0  -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*  -0.003*** -0.003**  0  0  -0.007*** -0.018***  0  -0.000**  Tel. lines per 
capita 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.005]  [0.000]  [0.000] 





Losses (% of 
output) 
[0.012] [0.016] [0.013] [0.007] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.010] [0.018] [0.026] [0.008] [0.005] [0.052] [0.107]  [0.007]  [0.002] 




[0.057] [0.068] [0.056] [0.046] [0.019] [0.016] [0.015] [0.052] [0.074] [0.120] [0.040] [0.029] [0.187] [0.449]  [0.037]  [0.010] 




(% of debt)  [0.004] [0.008] [0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.007] [0.015] [0.002] [0.002] [0.012] [0.050]  [0.002]  [0.000] 
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Table 8. Bank-level Regression Results 
Table shows results of regressing each indicator against the four bank-level variables (two ownership dummies, loan to assets and log of assets) along with one country level variable at a 
time. Regressions are estimated via OLS in all cases except for regressions on the number of places to open a deposit account and the number of places to submit a loan application where 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-0.004  -0.004  -0.001  -0.004* 0  -0.003* -0.003* -0.020***  0.012  -0.001  0.002  -0.004  0.044*  0.063  0.005  -0.001  Govt. Bank 
Share 
[0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.006] [0.008] [0.015] [0.004] [0.003] [0.023] [0.052] [0.004]  [0.001] 
0.010*  -0.008*  -0.007  -0.006**  -0.001  -0.004*** -0.005*** 0  -0.006  0.013  0  0.004*  0.017  -0.02  -0.003  0  Foreign Bank 
Share 
[0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.006] [0.008] [0.002] [0.002] [0.015] [0.033] [0.003]  [0.001] 
-1.541***  -0.547 -0.353 0.456  -0.119 -0.158 -0.041 0.013  -1.434 -3.453***  -0.452 -0.125 -4.232**  -12.207***  -0.297  -0.163**  Bank 
Concentration 
[0.543] [0.710] [0.539] [0.373] [0.184] [0.159] [0.155] [0.606] [0.878] [1.300] [0.387] [0.296] [1.845] [4.322] [0.375]  [0.081] 
-0.260** 0.325**  0.364*** 0.221*** 0.016  0.127*** 0.083*** -0.365***  0.248*  -0.033  0.015  0.025  0.726*  1.811**  0.028  0.034  Index  of  
Banking 
Restrictions  [0.101] [0.128] [0.099] [0.082] [0.034] [0.027] [0.028] [0.104] [0.148] [0.236] [0.073] [0.064] [0.386] [0.855] [0.072]  [0.023] 




(% of income 
per capita) 
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.003] [0.000]  [0.000] 




(Composite)  [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.006] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.008] [0.013] [0.020] [0.006] [0.005] [0.029] [0.059] [0.006]  [0.002] 
-0.871***  1.654***  0.581*  0.395 0.055 0.252***  0.165*  -0.783***  0.386 0.4  0.01  -0.068  2.094**  5.809**  -0.397 -0.062  Share of Govt. 
Owned Media  




Technical appendix for section 5 
 
The use of a lognormal function to model income distribution was first suggested by Gibrat 
(1931) and widely used in the subsequent literature.  Recently, Lopez and Serven (2006) show 
that the size distribution of income per capita is indeed very well approximated by a lognormal 
density function.  Specifically, they cannot reject the null hypothesis that theoretical income 
quintiles shares computed from the Gini coefficient are equal to empirically observed quintile 
shares from income-based household surveys.  
 
Log normality implies the following relationship between the Gini coefficient G, the standard 
deviation σ of log income and the Lorenz curve L(p):   
 
σ = √2 Φ
-1  [ ( 1 + G ) / 2 ]          ( 1 )  
 
L(p) = Φ (Φ
-1(p) - σ)          ( 2 )  
 
 
where Φ(.) denotes the cumulative normal distribution.   The assumption of log-normality thus 
implies a one-to-one mapping of the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz curve and therefore also a 
one-to-one mapping between the Gini coefficient and income percentiles.  We therefore can use 
the observed Gini coefficient to calculate theoretical income percentiles Pj j = 1,…,99 as follows: 
 
Pj  =  L(.01j)  –  L(.01(j-1))  j=1,…,99.         (3) 
 
Substituting in (1) and (2) yields: 
 
Pj = Φ{Φ
-1(.01j) - √2 Φ
-1 [(1+G)/2]} - Φ{Φ
-1(.01(j-1)) - √2 Φ
-1 [(1+G)/2]} (4) 
 
We can then compute income per capita yj for each percentile j as function of Pj and income per 
capita y. 
 
yj = yPj/0.01.          (5) 
 
We then multiply yj with household size to get to the average household income hj for each 
income distribution percentile. While household size is expected to vary with income level 
within countries, we do not have data available on household size distribution, and are therefore 
not able to adjust for this effect.  Finally, we compare hj j=1,…,99 with the annual checking and 
saving account fee to determine j such that 0.02*hj < account fee and .02*hj+1 > account fee.  
Income distribution percentile j thus indicates the percentage of the population that cannot afford 
checking (saving) account services.  
 
Data on income per capita and household size are from World Development Indicators and Gini 








Affordability   Eligibility 
Country 







































Albania   2.03 2263.77  1.00  535.19  2.25  16.05  11.69 
Algeria   2 38967.05  0.00  1298.9  0.30  14  30 
Armenia   2 1042.28  0.19  234.16  2.81  9.94  10.95 
Australia   5 10.06  16.66  41.12  1.35  7.19  2.59 
Bangladesh   2.12 55.28  0.15  1412.52  0.18  34.55  33.48 
Belarus   n.a. 7.12  n.a.  0  n.a  7.34  8.74 
Belgium   2.45 28.29  8.95  86.18  1.36  3.6 5.24 
Bolivia   2.74 759.35  0.81  1124.84  0.59  23.26  15.03 
Bosnia Herzegovina  2.73 573.97  1.20  484.92  1.49  14.7  16.65 
Brazil   4.85 19.19  2.94  n.a.  n.a  10.32  n.a. 
Bulgaria   3.42 130.35  2.05  213.32  11.41  21.38  6.84 
Cameroon   2.14 16393.68  4.26  1544.77  0.86  12.91  16.97 
Chile   5 n.a.  n.a.  213.2  0.34  n.a.  70.63 
Colombia   3.47 2131.83  0.23  n.a.  n.a  11  5.14 
Croatia   3.43 146.24  0.94  183.04  1.17  11.89  4.53 
Czech Republic   3.13 4.96  0.70  84.65  0.60  8.05  6.66 
Denmark   5 0  1.73  0  1.59  1  4.56 
Dominican Rep.  4.67 89.32  29.32  176.1  3.56  6.67  17.55 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  2.81 14.61  0.88  0 0.49  19.29  38.72 
Ethiopia   2 981.67  0.64  712.65  0.68  14.55  15 
France   4 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a  18.22  24.67 
Georgia   2.46 2345.59  0.99  290.71  0.73  5.03  4.56 
Germany   n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a  n.a.  n.a. 
Ghana   2.63 1044.39  1.31  1320.35  2.01 19.07  n.a. 
Greece   5 13.98  2.02  80.86  10.63  4.77  5.43 
Hungary   3.29 58  3.31  29  2.78  10.04  19.94 
India   2.44 57.77  0.93  145.17  0.74  19.98  9.45 
Indonesia   3.1 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a  16.59  6.07 
Israel   4.58 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a  1.79  12.08 
Jordan   2.05 354.7  1.02  362.27  0.85  8.16  7.24 
Kenya   3.27 193.78  1.57  n.a.  n.a  5.66  n.a. 
n.a. means not available because the banks that responded to the survey account for less than 30 percent of the market   48 
 
 




Affordability  Eligibility  
Country 







































Korea, Rep.  3.78 16.99  1.07  4.19  5.35  2.73  2.36 
Lebanon   4.6 4470.83  1.29  409  2.04  15.61  9.26 
Lithuania   4.25 17.54  0.88  65.83  0.80  9.83  8.48 
Madagascar   2.16 17.27  2.46  n.a.  n.a  18.6  n.a. 
Malawi   2.12 306.05  1.32  1738.08  1.14  15.39  14.16 
Malta   4.2 529  0.28  275.38  0.27  5.64  2.74 
Mexico   4.2 101.93  1.27  298.56  1.40  15.7  28.25 
Moldova   2.54 64216.77  1.34  428.58  1.09  7.31  3.9 
Mozambique   2.15 28.61  n.a.  71.53  n.a  25.84  34.21 
Nigeria   n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a  n.a.  n.a. 
Pakistan   3.09 n.a.  n.a.  954.59  n.a  31.98  28.44 
Peru   3.21 429.43  0.16  410.39  2.58  10.63  3.81 
Philippines   2.36 920.23  n.a.  763.35 1.04  44.13  12.21 
Romania   n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a  n.a.  n.a. 
Sierra Leone   1.77 218.23  1.76  5157.4  1.00  11.53  4.66 
Slovak Republic   3.64 50.91  1.23  71.15  n.a  3.06  4.67 
Slovenia   2.13 5.21  0.38  94.9  1.30  4.19  7.6 
South Africa   5 15.98  1.56  142.37  1.00  2.73  5.55 
Spain   5 19.35  1.06  100.19  0.89  1.83  3.22 
Sri Lanka   2.9 20.56  n.a.  51.64  1.00  15.57  20.61 
Swaziland   n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a  n.a.  n.a. 
Sweden   n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a  n.a.  n.a. 
Switzerland   3.12 11.28  0.00  22.57  0.00  3.24  1.56 
Trinidad Tobago  4.62 8.3  1.24  93.03  1.02  10.41  7.5 
Turkey   4.15 74.26  1.94  n.a. 2.00  13.75 n.a. 
Uganda   2 7039.03  1.51  n.a.  n.a  5.15  n.a. 
Zimbabwe  2.85 263.49  2.54  n.a.  n.a  7.91  n.a. 
                  
Minimum 1.77  0 0.00  0 0.00  1  1.56 
5th percentile  2  5.88 0.15  0.42 0.27  2.32  2.63 
Median 3.11  95.62 1.24 213.2 1.06  10.52  8.61 
Average 3.26  3051.43 2.43  505.27  1.82  12.3  13.34 
Maximum 5  64216.77 29.32  5157.4  11.41  44.13  70.63 
95th percentile  5  13119.55 8.25  1531.55  5.61  28.61  34.02 
n.a. means not available because the banks that responded to the survey account for less than 30 percent of the market   49 
 
 
Table A.2: Definition and sources for explanatory variables in Table 8 
Variable  Source 
Bank-level Government Ownership Dummy 
Bank-level Foreign Ownership Dummy  Micco, Panizza, andYanez (2007)  
Bank-level Loans / Assets 
Bank-level Total Assets 
Bank Concentration 
BankScope Database (August 2006). Fitch Ratings/Bureau van Dijk 
Tel. lines per capita 
Electric Power Transmission and Distribution Losses (% of output)  Estache and Goicoechea. (2005) 
Credit Information Index 
Costs of Enforcing Contracts (% of debt) 
Costs of Starting a Business (% of income per capita) 
World Bank (2006a) 
Govt. Bank Share 
Foreign Bank Share  Barth, Caprio, Levine. (2004).  
Index of Banking Restrictions  Index of Economic Freedom 2006. The Heritage Foundation/The Wall Street Journal 
Bank Disclosure Index (Composite)  World Bank (2006b) 
Share of Media Outlets Owned by the Government  Djankov et al. (2003) 
   50 
 
 
Table A.3. Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables in Table 8 
 
Variables Obs.  Std.  Dev.  Mean  Min  Median  Max 
Bank-level  Government  Ownership  Dummy  177  0.40 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Bank-level  Foreign  Ownership  Dummy  177  0.41 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Bank-level  Loans  /  Assets  185  0.16 0.46 0.00 0.48 0.80 
Bank-level Log of Total Assets  185  2.48  14.72  9.23  14.51  21.06 
Tel. lines per capita  58  215.59  223.63  2.35  174.17  745.31 
Electric Power Transmission and Distribution Losses 
 (% of output)  53  9.59  14.83 3.06  13.16 49.89 
Credit  Information  Index  55  2.02 3.20 0.00 4.00 6.00 
Costs of Enforcing Contracts (% of debt)  55  23.74  23.42  5.20  16.20  136.50 
Govt. Bank Share  47  23.97  18.60  0.00  11.00  96.00 
Foreign  Bank  Share  43  29.63 38.42 0.00  30.00 90.00 
Bank  Concentration  57  0.17 0.66 0.34 0.64 1.00 
Index  of  Banking  Restrictions  58  1.02 2.66 1.00 3.00 5.00 
Costs of Starting a Business (% of income per capita)  55  220.01  78.65  0.00  22.40  1442.50 
Bank Disclosure Index (Composite)  58  12.49  63.72  28.00  63.00  89.00 
Share of Media Outlets Owned by the Government  46  0.34  0.20  0.00  0.00  1.00 
 







Table A.4. Correlation between Explanatory Variables in Table 8 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Electric Power Transmission 
and Distribution Losses  
(%  of  output)  -0.568***               
Credit  Information  Index  0.469***  -0.482***              
Costs of Enforcing Contracts  
 (% of debt)  -0.438***  0.292***  -0.25***             
Govt.  Bank  Share  -0.08  0.195**  -0.157*  0.253***            
Foreign  Bank  Share -0.116  0.072  -0.109  -0.236***  -0.372***           
Bank  Concentration 0.054  -0.368***  -0.198***  0.054  -0.319***  0.179**          
Index of Banking Restrictions   -0.478***  0.398***  -0.463***  0.426***  0.567***  -0.4***  -0.079         
Costs of Starting a Business  
(% of income per capita)  -0.291***  0.142*  -0.363***  0.076  -0.098  -0.082  0.243***  0.443***        
Bank Disclosure Index 
(Composite)  0.577***  -0.482***  0.404***  -0.184**  0.062  -0.297***  -0.124*  -0.382***  -0.37***       
Share of Media Outlets 
Owned  by  the  Government  -0.422***  0.207**  -0.569***  -0.037  0.161*  0.052  0.284*** 0.312*** 0.282*** -0.463***         
Bank-level  Government 
Ownership Dummy  -0.082 0.09  -0.039 0.058  0.561***  -0.272***  -0.214***  0.364***  -0.002 0.036  -0.025      
Bank-level Foreign 
Ownership Dummy  -0.1  -0.086 -0.026 0.056  -0.244***  0.471***  0.23***  -0.213***  0.066  -0.123 0.067  -0.251***     
Bank-level  Loans  /  Assets 0.101  -0.164**  0.204***  -0.2***  -0.053 -0.059 -0.164**  -0.031 -0.165**  0.071  0.004  -0.131*  -0.136*   
Bank-level  Log of Total 







   52 
 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sample size: 56 countries
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